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COMMENTS
THE FETISH OF JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES:
A COMMENT ON RACHAL v. HILL
David L. Shapiro * and Daniel B. Coquillette
Rachal v. Hill, a 197o decision by the Fifth Circuit, indicated
that the seventh amendment right to jury trial may severely limit
developments in the principles of res judicata. Professor Shapiro
and Mr. Coquillette argue that such a limitation would be unsound,
and that it finds no support in history or Supreme Court precedent.
U NDER the influence of Supreme Court decisions on the right
to jury trial in civil cases in the federal courts,' most observ-
ers seem to develop a Pavlovian reaction to a seventh amendment,
jury trial issue whenever it arises. Any close question - and
sometimes one that is not so close -is resolved in favor of the
jury trial right without serious analysis of history, precedent, or
policy.
What may be of only passing interest in the classroom or in
legal commentary becomes a cause for concern when it spreads
to the lower federal courts. Yet the signs of contagion are ap-
pearing - perhaps the most conspicuous recent example being
the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Rachal v. Hill.3 At a time
of growing concern over crowded dockets, the size of judgments,
and the costs of litigation, the question whether we have more
trial by jury than we want or need is well worth asking -and
*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B. Harvard, 1954; LL.B. Har-
vard, 1957.
**A.B. Williams, x966; B.A. (Juris.) Oxford, i969; J.D. Harvard, 1971.
1 E.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (3970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962) ; Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 50o (1959).
2 See, e.g., Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (upholding defendant's right to a jury on an issue that had already been
determined adversely to it in the same proceeding; the prior determination was
rendered on appeal from a final judgment denying equitable relief); Cannon v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (following result of
Rachal v. Hill). An exception to this trend, however, can be seen in cases arising
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe to 2oooe-i5
(x964), perhaps in part because of the fear that in some areas of the country
juries would frustrate the statutory objective. See Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1264 & n.371 (197i).
3 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
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Rachal v. Hill is a case in point. The question seems particularly
appropriate against the background of substantial limitations on
the use of civil juries in England - whose history is our com-
mon law heritage and at least a point of departure for the analysis
of seventh amendment issues.
I
The first of the two actions involved in Rachal v. Hill began
when the SEC filed a complaint in a federal district court against
Mooney Aircraft, Inc., Mooney Corp., and Messrs. Rachal and
Hunnicutt. The complaint alleged the use of a fraudulent scheme
relating to the stock of the corporations, as well as other unlaw-
ful conduct, in violation of Sections 5 and 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933,' Section io(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,6 and Rule iob-5.7 Injunctive relief against continuance of
the alleged practices was sought. The corporations consented to
the entry of a permanent injunction, but Rachal and Hunnicutt
demanded and received a trial. The district court, sitting without
a jury, found that the two defendants had committed violations
of the securities laws as alleged and entered an order granting
the requested injunction on March 27, 1969.
The second action was brought against Rachal and Hunnicutt
by Hill as representative of the stockholders in the two corpora-
tions, and derivatively in behalf of the corporations. The plain-
tiff sought the recovery of damages sustained as a result of the
conduct complained of in the first proceeding. On the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the
fact issues relating to liability in the two proceedings were iden-
tical, that the defendants had had a full and fair trial, that no
suggestion of any new evidence had been made, and that de-
l Under the Administration of Justice Act of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, §
6, and Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 33, Rule 5, it is a matter of discre-
tion whether there shall be a jury in most civil actions in the Queen's Bench
Division. See Hope v. Great W. Ry., [1937] 2 K.B. 130. Moreover, the exercise
of discretion is subject to appellate control. See Ward v. James, [965] i All
E.R. 563 (C.A.), (in order to achieve uniformity in awards of damages, a trial
court should not order trial by jury in personal injury cases save in exceptional
circumstances). There is no jury trial in Chancery; when a Chancery action
involves one of the few issues on which a jury is guaranteed under the Adminis-
tration of Justice Act, the issue may be transferred to Queen's Bench for deter-
mination. See ODOERS' PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN Cim ACTONS
OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 274 (2oth ed. G. Harwood I97I).
* IS U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77(q)(a) (1970).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.Iob-5 (197i).
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fendants were collaterally estopped to deny the alleged violations
of the securities laws.8
On appeal, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded
for trial before a jury. Noting the modern trend of case and
commentary, the Fifth Circuit declined to base its decision on
the principle of mutuality of estoppel. It declared that a person
not a party to a prior proceeding could, in appropriate circum-
stances, rely on a determination made in that proceeding - could,
in other words, make use of the collateral estoppel doctrine
against an adversary who had litigated an issue and lost. What
prevented use of the doctrine in the case at hand, however, was
the equitable character of the first proceeding: Rachal and Hun-
nicutt could not have had a jury in that proceeding 9 and to estop
them now, in an action for damages, would interfere with their
jury trial right. While conceding the absence of a "case directly
in point," " the court placed heavy reliance on Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover," a 1959 Supreme Court decision holding it to
be error for a federal district judge to rule that an issue of fact
common to a legal and an equitable claim in the same proceeding
should be tried first to the court without a jury. After quoting
extensively from Beacon and citing several other recent federal
decisions, Judge Morgan, speaking for the court in Rachal, con-
cluded:
In light of the great respect afforded in Beacon Theatres,
supra, and its progeny, for a litigant's right to have legal claims
tried first before a jury in an action where legal and equitable
claims are joined, it would be anomalous to hold that the ap-
pellants have lost their right to a trial by jury on the issue of
whether they are liable to respond in damages for violations of
the security laws because of a prior adverse determination by
the district court of the same issue in an action in which their
' The district court also granted summary judgment on the other issues,
awarding $I,285.30 to Hill, dismissing the class action for failure to present com-
mon questions of fact, and awarding the corporations $454,000 from Rachal and
$5,96o from Hunnicutt.
9 See p. 449 & note 27 infra.
20435 F.2d at 63. In a footnote, the court acknowledged that one of its own
decisions -Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d
r08, (5th Cir. 1969) -had applied collateral estoppel in an analogous situation.
The case was distinguished, however, on the grounds that the issue of jury
trial was not raised and that since the parties in the second action had also been
adversaries in the prior proceeding, the case did not raise "the special considera-
tions required to insure justice in cases where mutuality of parties is lacking .... .
435 F.2d at 63 n.5. Cf. Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, Inc., 75 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.
1935), also cited by the Rachal court in the same footnote.
11359 U.S. 500 (1959).
[VOL. 85:442
JURY TRIALS IN CIVIL CASES
present adversary was not a party and which arose in a different
context from the present action. 12
The Supreme Court, busy with more important matters
and perhaps a bit fatigued with the subject of jury trials in civil
cases, denied certiorari near the close of the 197o Term.'3
II
The decline of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, recog-
nized in Rachal, has been the subject of much discussion by
courts and commentators 14 and will not be rehearsed here.'"
Nor will we discuss in any detail questions of the appropriateness
of collateral estoppel in the specific context of the statutory
scheme for administration of the securities laws. Our concern
in this comment is with the conclusion in Rachal that a party's
inability to obtain a jury trial in an initial proceeding for in-
junctive relief is, in itself, a basis for denying the application of
collateral estoppel in a subsequent action for damages against
that party.
Looking first at the authority relied on in the Rachal decision
itself, we find it wholly unpersuasive. As noted, almost all of the
court's eggs are placed in the Beacon Theatres basket. Although
Beacon Theatres, like other Supreme Court decisions, can be
12 435 F.2d at 64. Despite the passage quoted in text, it is not entirely clear
that the decision rested squarely on the seventh amendment. In the same para-
graph, the court said:
It hardly makes sense that Hill can now assume a position superior to that
to which he would have been entitled if he had been a party to the prior
action. Accordingly, we hold that the application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel was not appropriate in view of the particular circumstances pre-
sented by this case ....
Thus the decision may be explained simply as a refusal to extend the collateral
estoppel principle in a way that would raise serious seventh amendment questions.
12403 U.S. 904 (1971).
'
4 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Founda-
tion, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n,
1g Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, ig N.Y.2d 141,
225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest
Brews, 53 CALIF. L. Rnv. 25 (1965); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STA. L. Rv. 281 (1957); Greenebaum, In
Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1 (1969).
15 Suffice it to note our agreement with the Fifth Circuit that collateral es-
toppel effect should not be denied solely because the party asserting it was not a
party to the prior proceeding, and to note our surprise at the court's failure to
discuss the possible distinction between offensive and defensive use of the doc-
trine. See, e.g., the discussions of the distinction in Semmel, Collateral Estoppel,
Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 CoLumT. L. REV. 1457 (1968); Note, The
Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Non-
party, 35 GEo. WAsn. L. Rav. 101O (1967).
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broadly read as expressing a general policy in favor of jury trial,
and thus as supporting the Rachal decision, a closer look at the
Beacon Theatres case convinces us that, if anything, it cuts the
other way. The plaintiff in that proceeding had sought a declara-
tory judgment that certain contractual arrangements relating to
"clearances" for the showing of films did not violate the antitrust
laws and had also sought an injunction pendente lite restraining
the defendant from bringing suit under those laws to challenge
the arrangements. The defendant denied the allegations and coun-
terclaimed for treble damages under the antitrust laws. In ruling
that the trial judge erred in denying defendant's request that
issues common to the equitable claim and the legal counterclaim
be tried first to a jury, the Supreme Court said:
[T]he effect of the action of the District Court could be, as the
Court of Appeals believed, "to limit the petitioner's opportunity
fully to try to a jury every issue which has a bearing upon its
treble damage suit," for determination of the issue of clearances
by the judge might "operate either by way of res judicata or
collateral estoppel so as to conclude both parties with respect
thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage claim." 16
Note the assumption of the Court in Beacon Theatres that if an
issue were tried first before a judge, relitigation of the issue before
a jury in the same proceeding "might" be barred by principles of
"res judicata or collateral estoppel." 17 Indeed, if such relitigation
were not barred, it is difficult to see how a basis for mandamus
to the district judge in Beacon Theatres could have been made
out. Unnecessary expenditure of judicial time in trying an issue
without a jury and then trying it again with a jury, instead of
settling it once and for all with a jury at the outset, can hardly
constitute such an excess of authority as to call for the issuance
of mandamus.
Beacon Theatres thus indicated that whenever principles of
former adjudication or law of the case might preclude jury trial on
an issue previously litigated before a judge in the same proceed-
ing, the trial judge must, in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances, order the trial of issues within that proceeding to assure
that foreclosure does not occur. But Beacon Theatres did not
imply that principles of former adjudication should themselves be
16359 U.S. at 504.
1" Since the question involved a determination of the issue in the same pro-
ceeding, the applicable doctrine would seem to be not res judicata but the more
flexible "law of the case." See Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion,
1967 UTAH L. REv. i, x5-2o; Note, Law of the Case, 5 STAN. L. REv. 75i (x953).
For a recent holding contrary to the assumption in Beacon Theatres, see
Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 97).
[Vol. 85:442
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changed under the influence of the seventh amendment. Rachal
takes exactly the opposite tack from Beacon Theatres, concluding
that seventh amendment considerations do influence the applica-
tion of these principles when reordering is impossible, as it was in
Rachal because of the separateness of the two proceedings.
Beacon Theatres' reasoning also emphasized the impact of pro-
cedural reforms on the jurisdiction of equity to grant the relief
sought by the plaintiff:
Since in the federal courts equity has always acted only when
legal remedies were inadequate, the expansion of adequate legal
remedies provided by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the
Federal Rules [especially Rule 13, relating to counterclaims]
necessarily affects the scope of equity. Thus, the justification for
equity's deciding legal issues once it obtains jurisdiction, and
refusing to dismiss a case, merely because subsequently a legal
remedy becomes available, must be re-evaluated in the light of
the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules which allow
legal and equitable causes to be brought and resolved in one
civil action.18
In this respect as well, Rachal and Beacon Theatres are quite
dissimilar. No procedural reforms - merger of law and equity,
declaratory judgments, or anything else -can be said to have
affected the equitable character of the relief sought by the SEC
in the initial proceeding or to have given the defendants a right
to a jury in that action. Instead, Rachal raises the wholly dif-
ferent question whether the seventh amendment requires reliti-
gation of an issue already decided adversely to the party who
now asserts a jury trial right. Is there really an anomaly, as the
Fifth Circuit seemed to think, in concluding that a jury must
be given on an issue not yet adjudicated, but that an issue need
not be relitigated once it has been decided by the court sitting
alone?
No greater support for the Rachal result can be garnered from
the two other Supreme Court decisions cited in the Fifth Circuit
opinion: Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood 9 and Scott v. Neely.2" In
Dairy Queen the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff com-
bined a demand for an injunction with a demand for damages,"
18359 U.S. at 509 (footnotes omitted).
19369 U.S. 469 (1962).
20 140 U.S. io6 (1891). This case, while not cited directly in Rachal, did ap-
pear in a passage quoting from Beacon Theatres. 435 F.2d at 64.
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 53x (i97o), not cited in Rachal, in some respects goes
beyond earlier decisions in applying the seventh amendment. See The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. i, 172-76 (97o). Like its predecessors,
however, it does not lend direct support to the Rachal result.
21 The demand was designated one for an "accounting," but the Court in-
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the defendant had a right to a jury on any common issues.2 And
in Scott, a leading nineteenth century decision on jury trial, the
Court held that a federal court in a diversity case should not fol-
low a state statute allowing a creditor to sue in equity to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance before his claim against the debtor
had been reduced to a judgment at law. To allow such a "blend-
ing" of claims in a federal equity proceeding would be to broaden
the scope of equity jurisdiction and therefore to deny the debtor's
right to a jury on the issue of the existence of the debt. Thus
Dairy Queen, like Beacon Theatres, involved the delicate problem
of- adjusting seventh amendment rights to a merged system of
law and equity, while Scott established that existing jury trial
rights in the federal courts could not be eroded by state laws
telescoping legal and equitable claims into a single equitable pro-
ceeding.
The holding in Scott seems beyond any serious argument, even
after the merger of law and equity in the federal courts; and
although there is room for debate about such decisions as Beacon
Theatres and Dairy Queen, we need not grapple with those pro-
nouncements here. Taking them for all they are reasonably worth,
the question raised in Rachal was not concluded against the
plaintiff. If we assume that they do not compel an answer in
his favor, are there other sources, not considered by the court,
that might have informed the result?
III
The seventh amendment provides that the right to trial by
jury in suits "at common law . . . shall be preserved . .. .
The reference to preservation of a right suggests the relevance
of the nature of that right in 1791, when the seventh amendment
became effective, but no material bearing on that issue is alluded
to by the Rachal court. The omission, a bit startling at first
glance, may be explainable on several grounds. One might ask,
for example, whether it can really aid in resolving a jury trial
issue to examine the state of the law almost two centuries ago -
at a time when law and equity were often administered by sep-
arate courts and when the statutory rights now asserted were
not even dreamed of. And.whose law should one look to if such
sisted that the plaintiff's "choice of words" was not controlling. 369 U.S. at 478.
The action, in the Court's view, was one in which damages, a legal remedy, were
being sought.
22 When law and equity were separately administered, the plaintiff could pre-
sumably have insured a jury on the common issues by going to law first for damages
and then to equity for an injunction. The effect of Dairy Queen was to give both
parties a guarantee of a jury on common issues under a merged procedure.
JURY TRIALS IN CIVIL CASES
an examination is to be made? Procedures in each of the colonies
varied widely and developed, at least to some degree, indepen-
dently."3 Reports of American decisions during this period are
rare,24 and although the English reports are more complete, sig-
nificant changes in the relationship between law and equity were
in process.25 Any snapshot of the English system as of 1791 is
therefore likely to be misleading and, in any event, of little utility
in coping with present-day problems. 6
Despite the admitted force of these arguments, we do not see
how an historical inquiry can be avoided when a seventh amend-
ment question is raised. Even the most ardent critic of any his-
torical test would concede that matters that would have fallen
entirely within the jurisdiction of a court of equity or admiralty
in 1791 do not come within the definition of a suit at "common
law" under the seventh amendment.2 Nor, in our view, can it
23 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 565-66 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) ;
Wilson, Courts of Chancery in America- Colonial Period, 18 Am. L. REv. 226
(884), in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AmERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779 (1908);
Fisher, The Administration of Equity Through Common Law Forms in Pennsyl-
vania, in id. at So; Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, So
HARv. L. REv. 289 (x966).
24 See Henderson, supra note 23, at 299-300.2 2 See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *55; CUNNINGHAm'S LAW DICTION-
ARY, at "Chancery," sec. 2 (2d ed. 1771).
2 For the conclusion that the Supreme Court has become impatient with
historical inquiry and has, in significant part, rejected it, see The Supreme Court,
1969 Term, supra note 2o, at 175-76. For a full and provocative discussion of the
relevance of historical investigation to current problems, see F. JAMEs, CiVm PRO-
CEDURE §§ 8.1-.11 (1965) C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (2d ed. 1970);
McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, Ix6 U. PA. L. REv. I (x967).
With respect to the scope of the sixth amendment guarantee of jury trial in
criminal cases the Supreme Court's rejection of history as affording a controlling
test has been even more explicit. Thus in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968),
the Court held that a right to trial by jury exists in certain criminal contempt
proceedings. In a long footnote, the Court found the historical materials am-
biguous and then concluded: "In any event, the ultimate question is not whether
the traditional doctrine is historically correct but whether the rule that criminal
contempts are never entitled to a jury trial is a necessary or an acceptable con-
struction of the Constitution." Id. at 200 n.2.
The Court's reluctance to be bound by history in sixth amendment cases does
not, however, require that the seventh amendment receive similar treatment.
While the right to a jury in a criminal case has been held protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) ;
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), no such conclusion has been or seems
likely to be reached with respect to the jury trial right in civil cases. Thus analysis
of the latter question seems less likely to be cut loose from its historical moorings
by prevailing notions of fundamental fairness associated with the due process
guarantee.2 7 See 2 J. STORY, COMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
1971]
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be concluded that a clear historical basis for a jury trial claim
should be overridden if an analysis of the values and limitations
of juries indicates that trial by jury is inappropriate. 8 Freed from
any constitutional restraint, we might decide, as the English have,
to eliminate jury trial in virtually all civil actions. But surely
that avenue is closed so long as the seventh amendment con-
tinues in its present form.
Difficult as it may be, then, we believe some effort must be
made to determine the state of the law in the late eighteenth
and early ninetenth centuries- to determine, in other words,
what it was that the seventh amendment was seeking to preserve.
True, the frequently inconclusive character of the evidence, to-
gether with the changes in substance and procedure that have
followed, compel us to regard the inquiry as a beginning rather
than an end. But they cannot compel its abandonment.
In the context of Rachal, a key question to be posed at the out-
set is whether a determination of an issue made by a court of
equity was given preclusive effect in a subsequent proceeding at
law, even though the effect of such preclusion would be to deprive
a litigant of a jury trial on the issue in the second action.2
With the question thus sharply focused, the answer still does
not emerge with absolute clarity. The relationship between the
Chancery and the common law courts was sometimes far from
cordial.3" And the doctrine of res judicata lacked the precision
§ 1768 (5th ed. 1891). Thus it seems clear that neither the SEC nor the de-
fendants in the suit for injunctive relief that preceded Rachal would have had a
constitutional right to a jury on any issue. Nor is there anything in the securities
laws to indicate the presence of a statutory right to a jury trial. In fact, a request
for a jury was denied in an analogous proceeding, brought by the Secretary of
Labor under the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, § I6,
ch. 676, 52 Stat. io69 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216-17 (1970), despite
the suggestion that collateral estoppel might subsequently bind the defendant in
an action for damages. Mitchell v. Michigan-U.S. Indus. Glove & Laundry Co.,
x89 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Mich. ig6o).
2 For a forceful statement that a functional test has a place in an historical
frame, see Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (2962).
29This question should be distinguished from the much-debated question
of the nature of the obligation created by an equity decree, and particularly
its extra-territorial effect. See, e.g., RESTATM NT (SECOND) OF CoNmicr or LAws
§ 102 (97i) ; Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effects of the Equitable Decree, 17
MICH. L. REV. 527 (x919); Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land De-
crees, 21 U. Cwr. L. Rav. 620 (1954). While the historical materials discussed do
bear on both questions, the question raised in the'text is one of collateral estoppel,
rather than of "merger" or "bar." See Currie, supra, at 645-46.
'°The conflict over the jurisdiction of Chancery during the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries caused some uncertainty as to the nature of a
Chancery decree. Sir Edward Coke argued that the Chancery was "no court of
record." E. CoxE, TmHm INsTi TTE fol. 223. Further, he contended that the
ancient statute of Praemunire, 27 Edw. III, c. 1 (I353), prohibited the Chancery
[Vol. 85:442
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reflected in our present understanding of such terms as "merger,"
"bar," and "collateral estoppel." But by the end of the eighteenth
century, it appears to have been generally agreed that deter-
minations made in equity were binding in courts of law. Strong
support for this conclusion is furnished by several treatises of
the times, including Francis Buller's Trials at Nisi Prius, first
printed in England in 1772, and Thomas Peake's A Compendium
of the Law of Evidence, first printed in England in i8oi, both
of which were also published in the United States.31 Thus Peake
tells us that "[t]he decree [in equity] is evidence on the same
principle as a judgment in a Court of Law, and subject to the
like rules," 3. while Buller's discussion is even more explicit:
A decree in chancery may be given in evidence between the
same parties or any claiming under them, for their judgments
must be of authority in those cases, where the law gives them a
jurisdiction; for it were very absurd that the law should give
from interfering with the judgments of the common law courts. E. CoxE, TIRD
INSTITUTE fol. 119, 120.
This conflict, fully discussed in Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere Disinterred: The
Attack on the Chancery in x6z6, 36 ILL. L. Rav. 127 (194), had little to do with
jury trial issues. On the few occasions when a jury question was raised, it was
done in an ancillary way. See, e.g., Heath v. Rydley, 79 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B.
z614). Moreover, the accuracy of Coke's assertion that Chancery and other courts
were not of record has been persuasively challenged. See Thorne, Courts of
Record and Sir Edward Coke, 2 U. TORONTO L.J. 24 (i937).
Coke's campaign suffered a decisive defeat in the famous Judgment of James
I in 1616, 21 Eng. Rep. 65, but the "court of record" argument had a strange
afterlife, based primarily on the posthumous prestige of Coke's Institutes. Traces
of it can be found throughout the eighteenth century and even in the writings of
Langdell in the late nineteenth century. See C. LAN OELL, A SumrApy OF EQUITy
PLEADING 35 n.4 (at 37) (2d ed. 1883). But see, e.g., Barbour, supra note 29, at
539-47. The argument undoubtedly influenced some judges, as in Marret v. Sly,
82 Eng. Rep. 1265 (Ch. i658) (equitable decree not evidence in court of common
law), and Post v. Neafie, 3 Cal. R. 22, 34-37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 18o5) (dissenting
opinion).
:t Peake's treatise was printed in Philadelphia in 1802 and Bulier's in New
York in 1788. These books, together with those cited in note 34, infra, were among
the earlier treatises to be published in the United States. See James, A List of
Legal Treatises Printed in the British Colonies and the American States Before
zSoz, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS WRITTEN IN HONOR OF AND PRESENTED TO J.H.
BEALE AND S. WILLISTON 159, 184, 199 (2934); Wallach, The Publication of Legal
Treatises in America from x8oo to 183o, 45 LAW LIBRARY J. 236 (1952). All
treatises dealing with evidence and procedure referred to in these two articles have
been consulted, as well as a number of English treatises of the period not published
in the United States. With one minor exception, G. JACOB, EvERYWAN His OwN
LAWYER 94 (N.Y., 1768), nothing inconsistent with the excerpts quoted here has
been found.
32 T. PEAKE, A ComPENDIUm OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 44 (Philadelphia,
1802). See also id. at 55.
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them a jurisdiction, and yet not suffer what is done by force of
that jurisdiction to be full proof.
And note; Wherever a matter comes to be tried in a col-
lateral way, the decree, sentence, or judgment, of any court,
ecclesiastical or civil, having competent jurisdiction, is conclu-
sive evidence of such matter; and in case the determination be
final in the court of which it is a decree, sentence, or judgment,
such decree, sentence, or judgment will be conclusive in any other
court having concurrent jurisdiction.
In consequence of the first part of this rule, if in ejectment a
question arose about the marriage of the father and mother of
the plaintiff, a sentence in the ecclesiastical court in a cause of
jactitation would be conclusive evidence. 33
Similar statements are to be found in other important treatises
of the period.34
Contemporaneous judicial writings on both sides of the Atlantic
support the statements in these treatises. Thus in Hart v. Love-
lace, 3  decided in King's Bench in 1795, the court had to deter-
mine whether it was precluded from holding certain written in-
struments invalid as a result of prior litigation concerning the
instruments in the Court of Chancery. No question of the validity
of the instruments had been raised in the prior proceeding, and
the court concluded that the question was still open. Lord Ken-
yon stated:
In the course of this argument I have had some difficulty in my
mind respecting the [prior] decree in the Court of Chancery.
If this question had been brought before that Court, and re-
ceived a judicial decision, I should have thought myself bound
by it, as being the judgment of a Court having competent juris-
diction over the subject matter: but the proceedings there were
diverso intuitu; that suit had a different object in view: and
the question before us did not arise in that Court.3 6
31 F. BULLER, TRIALS AT Nisi PPaIuS 243-44 (N.Y., I8o6).
34See LORD GI.ERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 67 (5th ed. 1788) ("A Decree in
Chancery may be given in Evidence, and so may a Sentence in the Ecclesiastical
Courts, for their Judgments must be of Authority in those Cases, where the Law
gives them a Jurisdiction .... "); 2 Z. SwIFT, A Sys= 0F TorE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CoNNEcICUT 478 (1796) ("Action of debt will lie on the decree of a
court of chancery, to recover the penalty, for not performing the decree.").
35 ioi Eng. Rep. 654 (K.B. 1795).
36 Id. at 657. The two concurring judges, Grose and Lawrence, agreed that
consideration was not precluded by the proceeding in Chancery "because this
question was not agitated in that Court, though, if it had, they [the judges]
thought it would have been conclusive here." Id; cf. Perry v. Phelips, 32 Eng.
Rep. 756, 757 (Ch. I8O4); Scott v. Shearman, 96 Eng. Rep. 575, 576 (K.B. 1775)
(condemnation proceeding in Exchequer-a type of proceeding in which we
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In the United States, the New York Supreme Court, as early as
1805, allowed an action of debt at law to be maintained on a
decree of a sister state's court of chancery for the payment of
money. 7 And there is broad language in other New York deci-
sions recognizing the obligations of courts of law and equity to
honor each other's determinations. Witness the observation of
Chancellor Kent in 1815, and its resemblance to the passage
quoted from Buller:
Where courts of law and equity have concurrent jurisdiction
over a question, and it receives a decision at law, equity can no
more re-examine it than the courts of law, in a similar case,
could re-examine a decree of the court of chancery. 38
The chancellor here was echoing a similar declaration by the
New York Court of Errors in i8oo:
The general principle, that the judgment or decree of a court
possessing competent jurisdiction, shall be final as to the sub-
ject matter thereby determined, is conceded on both sides, and
can admit of no doubt.39
believe a jury was not used-was "conclusive evidence to the jury" in an action
in trespass for seizing the goods condemned) (unanimous holding).
" Post v. Neafie, 3 Cai. R. 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. i8o5). For a later Supreme
Court decision to the same effect, see Pennington v. Gibson, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
65 (1853); cf. Brady v. Daly, I75 U.S. 148, 159 (I899) (determination in equity
proceeding that a scene in a play was protected by copyright held binding in sub-
sequent action for damages); Smith v. Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198 (1849)
(assignee of mortgage sued in federal court in ejectment; action held barred by
prior state court determination in equity foreclosure action that the mortgage
was void) ; Dobson v. Pearce, I N.Y. 1s6 (1854) (Connecticut equity decree en-
joining plaintiff from enforcing New York judgment, on ground that the judg-
ment was obtained by fraud, held conclusive evidence of fraud in plaintiff's action
on the judgment in New York).
" Simpson v. Hart, i Johns. Ch. 91, 97 (N.Y. 1814). The court in this case
held itself bound by a prior determination at law refusing to allow a set-off. Hart
v. Lovelace was cited in support of the result.
9 Le Guen v. Gouverneur, x Johns. Cas. 436, 492 (N.Y. Ct. Err. I800).
See also Gelston v. Hoyt, i Johns. Ch. 543, 546 (N.Y. 1815); Picket v. Morris,
2 Va. (2 Wash.) 255, 270-71 (X796) (argument of John Marshall as counsel);
Blacklock v. Stewart, 2 Bay 363 (S.C. 1802). In the Blacklock case the court
decided, in an action at law on an insurance policy, that it was not bound by
a foreign decree in admiralty because of the uncertainty of the ground of the
admiralty court's decision. The South Carolina court concluded, however, that
"If the ground on which the sentence proceeded, is valid by the law of nations,
and it is set forth with sufficient certainty, we are bound by it . . . ." Id. at 367.
Joseph Story wrote not many years after these decisions that an equity decree
"is, for most purposes, if not for all, of as high a dignity and character, as a judg-
ment in a Court of Law." J. STORY, EQUTY~ PLEADINGS 798 (sth ed. 1852).
Estoppel on the record could be asserted on the basis of any final determination
"whether it be a judgment or decree, a Court of Law, or a Court of Equity."
Id. at 796.
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Small wonder, then, that the matter is treated casually in the
Restatement of Judgments as an illustration of the general rule
of collateral estoppel:
Where in a proceeding in equity a question of fact is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final decree, the deter-
rmination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent pro-
ceeding at law or in equity on a different cause of action.40
But, a defender of the Rachal result might argue, the historical
inquiry cannot end here; the seventh amendment was designed
to ensure that if a litigant had a right to a jury in I79i, for what-
ever reason, that right would continue to be recognized. Since
limitations on the doctrine of collateral estoppel- in particular
the doctrine of mutuality-would have made it impossible for
Hill to deprive Rachal and Hunnicutt of a jury on the issue of
liability in an analogous proceeding in 179I,41 they should not
be deprived of their right to a jury today.
This argument is not without force. A complete rebuttal might
require a showing that the framers of the seventh amendment
did not intend to foreclose developments in principles of former
adjudication despite the effect such developments might have on
the jury trial right. The history of the amendment, however, does
not permit so close an analysis of intent,42 and it therefore seems
appropriate to consider more broadly whether the courts and
commentators of the day perceived a link between the existing
limitations on res judicata and the jury trial right.
Although the evidence is essentially negative in character, we
do not believe that such a link existed. The doctrine of mutuality
was plainly regarded as applicable whether or not the prior ad-
judication was one before a jury; the rationale underlying mu-
tuality was found in the unfairness of binding a litigant by a
prior determination when his adversary could not be bound by
that same determination.43 Since determinations at law and in
equity were entitled to the same respect, there is nothing in the
jurisprudence of the times to suggest that any modification of
the mutuality principle would have been confined to instances in
which the first determination had been at law or before a jury.
There are, in addition, affirmative reasons for rejecting a de-
fense of Rachal based on the law of mutuality as it stood in i79I.
First, it would reduce the historical inquiry to an absurdity. Since
40 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment j (U942).
41 Thus Peake, for example, at another point in his treatise, spels out the then-
accepted view of mutuality as a requirement for application of res judicata. PEAKE,
supra note 32, at 27.
42 See Henderson, supra note 23, at 291-99.
43See, e.g., PEAKE, supra note 32, at 27.
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mutuality is only one aspect of the broader doctrine of res judi-
cata, would it not follow from acceptance of the defense that the
precise boundaries of the entire doctrine as of 179I would have
to be marked? That, for example, developments in the doctrine
with respect to "privity," "' finality,4" the meaning of a judgment
"on the merits," " the distinction between ultimate and mediate
facts,47 etc., would all have to be given fixed dates of birth before
it could be decided whether a judgment in equity precludes re-
litigation at law? Even the hardiest antiquarian would, and
should, blanch at the prospect of such an undertaking.
Second, we believe it impossible to discern any rational basis
for the line that would have to be drawn. The Rachal court did
say that "special considerations" were "required to insure justice
in cases where mutuality of parties is lacking." " But surely the
statement was a makeweight designed to help brush off a disturb-
ing precedent.49 Should Rachal have been a different case if, say,
the plaintiff in the damage action were a person or agency in "priv-
ity" with the SEC? Not surprisingly, a favorable comment on the
Rachal decision has urged that its rationale be extended to the
two-party situationP0 We agree in part: the law must move one
way or the other because such an arbitrary line is inherently un-
stable. As long as the line exists, the "ghost" of mutuality "still
walks abroad, somewhat shrunken in size, yet capable of much
mischief." 1
IV
This historical inquiry, though cursory, indicates that in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, determinations in
equity were thought to have as much force as determinations at
law, and that the possible impact on jury trial rights was not
44 See, e.g., Note, Nonparties and Preclusion by Judgment: The Privity Rule
Reconsidered, 56 CsaLr. L. REv. iog8 (1968).
41 See, e.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d so, 89-90
(2d Cir. i961), cert. denied sub nom. Dawson v. Lummus Co., 368 U.S. 986 (1962).
48 See, e.g., FED. R. Crw. P. 41; Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795 (5th
Cir. 1970), noted in 31 U. Mn. L. REv. 85 ('97').
17 See, e.g., The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub.
nom. The Evergreens v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 720 (1944); Developments in the
Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 8M8, 842-43 (1952).
48 435 F.2d at 63 n.5.
'9 See note io supra.
1o 40 U. Cn4. L. Rav. 373, 381 (197i): "[Tlhe logic of Rachal suggests a broader
rule - that regardless of the blending or sequence of legal and equitable deter-
minations, the right to a jury trial on legal issues can never be lost through prior
equitable determination."
1, Sampson v. Channell, 1io F.2d 754, 761 (ist Cir.) (Magruder, J., referring
to Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) i (1842)), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
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viewed with concern.2 But as already suggested, there are other
matters to be considered. Changes in procedure or other factors
may militate in favor of jury trial and may indeed require it as a
matter of constitutional right. 3 No such considerations were
brought forward by the Rachal court, however, and our own
study persuades us that the discernible policy factors cut against
any such conclusion. If collateral estoppel is otherwise warranted,
the jury trial question should not stand in the way.
As noted earlier, several key developments in the interpreta-
tion of the seventh amendment have sprung from the impact of
procedural reform on historical distinctions. For example, what
is the point of talking about the former practice of going to
law for damages after (or before) obtaining an injunction if the
two forms of relief not only may be combined in a single pro-
ceeding but probably must be under emerging notions of the
dimensions of a claim? 5 Does it make sense, in a merged pro-
cedure, to give the plaintiff but not the defendant a choice of a
jury, even if a close historical analysis might indicate such a
result? 11 And how can one meaningfully talk about an injunction
against an action at law when the "law" action in question is
filed as a counterclaim in the same proceeding, and a compulsory
one at that? 56
No such puzzlements are presented in Rachal. The problem
of the collateral estoppel effect to be given to the prior proceed-
ing is unaffected by merger, or indeed by any other reform in
judicial procedure since the adoption of the Constitution."7
52 Indeed, the materials suggest that jury trial questions as such were not
viewed as important in marking the boundaries between law and equity during
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. That such questions were not
entirely ignored, however, is indicated by two important decisions of the period.
In Denton v. Stewart, 29 Eng. Rep. 1i56 (Ch. 1786), the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion for specific performance of a contract for the sale of a house, and when it
was discovered that the property had been transferred by the defendant to an-
other, the court retained jurisdiction for the determination of damages resulting
from the breach. But some years later in Todd v. Gee, 34 Eng. Rep. lo6, 107 (Ch.
181o), Lord Eldon confined Denton to its particular circumstances and insisted that
ordinarily "this Court . . . would not give compensation for the damage, sus-
tained by not being able to complete the subsequent contract; which might fairly
be offered to the consideration of a jury."
" See McCoid, supra note 26.
54 See, e.g., F. JAmES, CivMi PROCEDURE §§ 11.10, M1.14 (1965); C. CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 137-46 (2d ed. 1947); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65
HARv. L. REv. 818, 824-31 (1952); Vestal, Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion: Judg-
ment for the Claimant, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 357, 361-65 (1967). But see, e.g., Wood-
bury v. Porter, 158 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1946).
5 See the discussion of Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, at pp. 4 4 i- 4 8 supra.
See the discussion of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, at pp. 445-47 supra.
17 Admittedly, the same argument could be made against the result in Ross
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Are there factors favoring a jury trial even though history,
viewed directly or through the prism of procedural change,
does not require it? " The costs are clear enough. The time of
the court must be taken up with relitigation of an issue already
fully tried in a proceeding in a coordinate court whose procedures
are comparable in every respect but the availability of a jury.
Hill, a private plaintiff whose resources are presumably limited,
is unable to derive any benefit from the earlier litigation con-
ducted by the government, even though the government itself
was acting to protect the interests of private investors like him.
And if the rights of the defendants here are of constitutional
dimension, they presumably cannot be impaired by Congress.
What, then, is the status of the provision of the antitrust laws that
a judgment or decree in a proceeding brought by the United
States "shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in
any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such
defendant under said [antitrust] laws . . . as to all matters
respecting which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel
as between the parties thereto"? 19 Does it violate the defen-
dant's seventh amendment rights if a prior determination estops
him on an issue, but not if it shifts to him the burden of going
forward?
We confess ourselves unable to find the benefits to be weighed
in the balance against the problems that are raised. Jury trial
in civil cases is not an unmixed blessing; 60 it is at least in some
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), upholding the right to a jury on certain issues
in a stockholder's derivative action. See McCoid, supra note 26, at 21-23. But,
rightly or wrongly, the Supreme Court in Ross saw the derivative suit as having
two aspects, only the first of which- the question of the stockholder's standing
to sue-is properly viewed as equitable in nature under a merged procedure. See
The Supreme Court, Y969 Term, supra note 20, at 172-76.
"s One such factor might arise if a defendant could show that the plaintiff
in the first proceeding had deliberately framed his complaint to have the issues
in the first proceeding tried without a jury, so that in a second proceeding he
could rely on collateral estoppel and circumvent a jury. This showing, however,
could presumably only be made when the litigants in both proceedings were the
same - that is, the case explicitly recognized and distinguished in Rachal, see
note io supra. Nor does this factor explain why a plaintiff in an initial equitable
proceeding should be granted jury trial in a subsequent proceeding against a
different adversary, a result which Rachal's rationale would support.
1a i5 U.S.C. § x6(a) (1970).
60 For critical appraisals of trial by jury in some or all civil actions, see, e.g.,
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND i7o-85 (1930); H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN,
& B. BUcauoLz, DELAY 3N TIH COURT 71-8i (1959); Lummus, Civil Juries and
the Law's Delay, 12 B.U.L. REV. 487 (1932); Peck, Do Juries Delay Justice?, IS
F. R. D. 455 (I956). See also Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury,
I3 MicH. L. REV. 302 (i915); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171, 187-89
(1968) (dissenting opinion). While not prepared to argue that civil juries are
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part responsible for delay in the courts, for escalation in the size
of damage awards, and for the high cost of judicial administra-
tion. Admittedly, the institution serves important values that
may justify its retention even in the absence of constitutional
constraints. But whatever its worth when an issue has not yet
been litigated, its use to retry a complex question already fully
and fairly aired in an adversary proceeding seems to us to in-
volve a net loss of substantial proportions. Nothing in the seventh
amendment, in the Supreme Court's interpretation of it, or in
considerations of fairness and justice requires such a loss to be
borne.
an anachronism serving no valid present purpose, we do view with alarm the
steady, uncritical extension of the seventh amendment into new domains.
